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LAW PROFESSOR-POST-WAR
By HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN*
I.' BLUEPRINT
N OW that the war has been concluded, the law schools must be
rehabilitated. It is a propitious time for making fresh starts
in the building of law schools and law faculties.
Law professors are important people. They admit it. We do,
however, have more than their own strut to back up the assertion.
The history of our country indicates a substantial influence exer-
cised by law-teachers upon the course of political thought.'
I think it would be admitted today, despite widespread active
prejudices, that lawyers are important people. They are entrusted
with or lay hold upon so much that is of public consequence that
their influence upon the development of national life is out of all
proportion to their number-and their number is large. Therefore
they ought to be quality products. Allowing for the inevitable ex-
ception, a lawyer is only as good as the people who make a lawyer
out of him. His teachers are responsible in no small degree for
making him what he is. Invariably, a man, who, by the common
consent of men of trustworthy judgment, is a leader at the Bar,
points to one or more great teachers as being entitled to the glory.
Really good law teachers are unbelievably few in number. It is not
that we suffer so much from a shortage of scholars who are orna-
ments of a sort to our law faculties, but we do suffer acutely from
a shortage of men who can meet what ought to be the specifications
for a teacher in a first class law school.
What goes to make a good law professor? It should be stated
*A. B. 1927, University of Iowa; LL.B. 1933, Yale University; J.S.D.
1934, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Georgetown University;
Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Department; author of An Outline of
Taught Law; Notes on American Legal Philosophy-The Beginnings to
Holmes and Pound (1943) 28 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEv 1; Who Wrote the
Mirror of Justices? (1942) 58 Law. Quar. Rev. 265; Federalization-Design
for Reform in a National Economy (1942) 91 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 91; Municipal
Debt Readjustment:. Present ,Relief and Future Policy (1938) 23 Corn. L.
Quar. 365; Provisional Arrest and Detention in International Extradition
(1934) 23 Geo. L. J. 37 and other articles in various legal periodicals.
'Witness the role of the law professor in public administration during the
past dozen years, particularly in the federal field. But law professors were
important people even before they became such doers. See my paner, An
Outline of Taught Law-The Beginnings to Holmes and Pound, (1943) 28
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that if the school is a large one, the work of the several faculty
members may be specialized to such a degree that some may be "re-
search professors." I am not discussing the man engaged to do re-
search and research only. I am talking about the man whose primary
job as a law professor is to teach law. What shall we seek in him?
I think we should expect him to meet six specifications:
1. He must be a scholar.
2. He must be able to express himself simply, adequately and
gracefully, both orally and by the pen.
3. He must be sufficiently interested in research to make some
contribution to the literature of the law.
4. He should have at least some experience in the workaday
world.
5. He should appreciate the law for what it is-an instrument
of social control.
6. He should have such a home as will permit him to teach in
it-and then do some teaching there.
All of the above are freely admitted to be "old stuff." To say
that is but to point the fact that, though "old stuff," these specifica-
tions have not been understood, or if understood, either not be-
lieved or acted upon.
II. NOTES ON THE SPECIFICATIONS
1. He must be a scholar.
"Of course," say the law school deans, trustees, regents and
such persons. But, judging from pre-war and current faculty
rosters, they do not mean what I mean. I mean a man who is learned
-not so much in the sense of being erudite and even less in the
sense of being a human warehouse for facts and figures-but rather
in the sense of a man so grounded in the law and other disciplines
as to make him proficient in interpreting, as distinguished from
merely parrotting, his subject for the student. Proficiency and
adeptness are not the equivalent of some such gobble-de-gook as
"mastery of Techniques."
2. He must be able to express himself simply, adequately and
gracefully, both orally and by the pen.
A lawyer must learn to express himself-both orally and by
the written word. That a man should be a first rate law professor
and not be able to do both is just about inconceivable. I said both.
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Invariably law faculties have been filled by men who write, though
just the other clay I asked the dean of a law school whether one of
his professors could write a good memorandum or a letter and,
believe it or not, he said, "I don't know, but he talks beautifully."
Not too much attention has been paid to the quality of the writing.
It has been often thought more important that a man write much
and often. Some awful vengeance ought to await those who have
made most of our law reviews such dull and barren waste.2 That
sin has been perpetrated by professors (aided and abetted by their
mimics at the Bar who should know better). I would have the law
professor express himself simply, adequately and gracefully. Not
all of the periodical writing by law professors has been dull and
heavy-a considerable quantity has been glib and flippant and some
of it has been explosive with wise-cracks which has proved mildly
entertaining when taken ift small doses. Some of this has been
simple in one sense of the word, but as criticism it has hardly been
adequate (though somewhat effective) and it has had about as
much grace as the slapstick of the sawdust ring. What's the answer?
I should think the answer is to (a) find a scholar and (b) expect
him to produce not too much 9nd not too often, but well-and that
means well enough to make himself understood by those he must
convince.
If you have the man who can write, the chances are that his
facility of expression is not a blessing to be conceived of as a certain
manual dexterity in wielding a pen. It is more likely a quality of
mind which extends to that man's every attempt at expression. If
he writes clearly, he probably speaks clearly because he thinks
clearly. But you must be certain bf that. Law school corridors
abound with able students who spend precious time and energy
cussing out some professor (who may be young or old) who,
though reputedly able to write, cannot make what he does in the
class room mean a thing. I know it is not all traceable to the failure
of the gift of adequate oral expression on the part of a professor.
He may be glib-tongued and yet not have the remotest idea of what
to do with the particular subject assigned to him in the particular
class room wherein he teaches. For no subject is there a standard
operating procedure. One man may teach a subject by talking
about it all the time. I have been well taught that way in one or tvo
subjects. Another man may use the problem method or still another
may treat cases as so many one act plays and huff and puff his sub-
2See Fred Rodell's paper, Goodbye to Law Reviews, (1936) 23 Va. L.
Rev. 38.
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ject out in multiplied melodrama. What matters so long as the pro-
fessor has gift of expression to do what he must do in the classroom
(and what he does in the classroom should, by no means, be the
sum total of his teaching) in the way he can best put his subject
across.
If, as Gibbon insisted, history is for the philosophic mind, so too
is law teaching. So your man who expresses himself adequately,
simply and gracefully must be an imaginative man and, if he is not,
he will not so express himself. One of the chief sins of the law
teacher has been compartmentilization. If the student somehow
gets the idea that the law is a web, albeit a seamy web, very few
law professors can legitimately claim credit for the realization.
Teaching law as it should be taught requires as a prerequisite in
the teacher a real appreciation of the interrelation of law with not
only the social sciences (whatever they are) but with those far
more significant And meaningful disciplines, philosophy and ethics
and history.
I am not attempting to minimize the need for technical knowl-
edge of the bread and butter subjects outside the law curriculum
such as accounting and certain courses in business economics and
finance. If one examines the roster of teachers at so-called ap-
proved schools one would be impressed by the fact that the vast
majority give evidence of knowing only the law. One could segre-
gate a small group who knew something of business and that is
ever so much to be desired. But the law teacher who walks famil-
iarly with, not only the law, but also with philosophy, history and
literature as well, is difficult indeed to find. I have been told that
in drawing my specifications for, not the ideal, but the acceptable
law professor, I have insisted upon too much and that enough men
to fill the specifications are not to be found. My persistent answer to
the objection is a double-barrelled one:
a. I know that a man cannot teach law as law ought to be taught
if he does not meet these specifications, and
b. I doubt that we have half tried to find the kind of men I am
talking about.
3. He must be sufficiently interested in research to make some
contrilnion to the literature of the law.
It is awfully important to understand what I mean about this.
Most university administrators do not. There is everywhere, de-
spite assaults made upon the notion, the feeling (which has become
a principle for action) that a man is good as a law professor di-
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rectly in proportion to the quantity he has published. He has written
much, ergo he is a whale of a teacher. There is so much the matter
with all this tragic non-sequitur. A man to be a good law professor
must be able to write not much but well-he must have made or be
making some real contribution to the literature of the law. For one
man it may be ten volumes on the law of Evidence, for another it
may be a compact essay on Legal Education and Public Policy.
Each has made a. real contribution and each has filled my specifica-
tion. The man who publishes articles in the law reviews in pro-
digious quantity may be a poor teacher primarily because he writes
so rfuch.
This principle for action, i.e., that the ability to write indicates
the ability to teach, has to a considerable degree accounted for the
practice of turning to editors-in-chief of the law reviews for
faculty positions. It is true that, all things considered, the law re-
view editors are perhaps the most promising group of youngsters
from which to make appointments to law faculties. More often than
we should like to admit, however, appointments have been made
with not over-much discernment upon the assumption that because
he was a great editor, he'll be a wow of a teacher. Maybe he won't.
4. He should have at least some experience in the workaday
world.
Out of the broadened activities of the past few years in the field
of social control has come the belief that the study of the law pre-
pares a man ever so well for-positions of responsibility in govern-
ment, industry and finance. The belief is just as erroneous as it is
firmly fixed. The truth of the matter is that the proper study of the
law prepares a man for stich positions of responsibility. All this is
something bigger than courses, methods and big name university
law schools. It is a matter of many things. Principally it is a matter
of surrounding oneself with -men having background, perception
and perspective and of correlating the law with all that it touches-
and that is just about everything. How achieve the desired stand-
ard? Its achievement calls for something new in the planning and
building of a law school. Look around you-you will not find a place
that comes very close to being what a law school ought to be. It is
here that the idea of balance in the faculty and program of the school
become of utmost importance. It is inescapable that the job cannot
be done as it should be done except by a faculty embracing men of
differing outlooks, tastes and fortes.
I would not be misunderstood. Of course, the principal purpose
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of a law school is the preparation of young men for the future prac-
tice of the law. I do not wish to minimize the importance of that
job. I do not labor the point, because it is the obvious point of the
story. The best lawyer was ever the man who knew not only the
law, but much besides, and that was equally true with respect to
both country lawyer and city lawyer.
But the market for law-trained men has broadened and there
is every indication that government and industry will have abundant
need for properly trained lawyers in the immediate post-war period.
Of course, no dean can go out and find a faculty each member
of which is learned in every known discipline. The important thing
is that when the faculty as a whole is appraised it be seen as a
composite of law men with varying interests and approaches with
each interest sufficiently matured and developed so as to spark the
particular law man's exposition and to make him a reasoning enthu-
siast. It should be regarded as an impoverished faculty which can-
not boast some men acquainted with the actual practice of the law.
Equally poor is the faculty unable to boast a law man who is ex-
perienced in business, another experienced in public administration,
another schooled in philosophy and ethics, another in economics,
and still another (and a very important one) who is a serious stu-
dent of history. This means a faculty of different men. The school
which goes out to recruit a faculty of one type-as for example was
done a decade or so ago by certain schools when it was thought that
able law men trained as economics-bolstered fact finders and as
human adding machines would make the law school par excellence
-falls far short. All that was just another reflection of "everything
matters but Everything" thinking. It fails to appreciate that eco-
nomic facts stripped bare have no meaning, no matter in what num-
bers you may collect them. Yes, law, too, is for the philosophic mind.
Legal education in America has been beset by two evils-
do-nothingism and fuddism. Those who have been charged with the
important business of legal education have for the most part de-
voted themselves mightily to seeing to it that nothing happened to
disturb the status quo. That, obviously, is do-nothingism. Those
who have set about to "reform" legal education have devoted them-
selves to a mighty crusade in one direction with the result that one
interpretation of the law (albeit an important one) was over-
emphasized, sometimes to a degree approaching the grotesque-the
result-fuddism, i.e., thinking about countless trifles, the thought
proceeding in every direction at any and all times.
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What is said above is not meant to imply that the status quo
boys were not vocal about legal education. There was much beating
the air about methods of legal education.
The long and tedious discussion about methods has been, for
the most part, so painfully pointless. A method is a way of doing
something. If you either have nothing to do or do not know what
you ought to be doing, method really matters very little. In fairness
it must be admitted that some attention has been given to subject
matter, but again much of the criticism that starts off as substance
shades off into mere discussion of method. Even more tragic than
the fact that the talk has been about methods rather" than content
of curriculum is the fact that in talking about methods we have for-
gotten about men. Methods are not a substitute for men and unless
and until the conception of what must be the minimum standards
for a law faculty are revised upward as I have suggested we may
just as well forget the chatter about methodology.
5. He should appreciate the'law for what it is-an instrrent
of social control.
I realize that a specification such as this may become somewhat
lighter than air. But appreciation means common sense, which means
that anyone who appreciates the idea of law as an instrument of
social control will have his feet on the ground. So many of the
people who prate about social coitrols are fakers-and because they
are the whole idea of effective social control, so completely basic to
an ordered world, is brought into disrepute. I would bolt the doors
of the law schools tightly to the people who are glib on this matter.
My appreciator must be a man who knows the law as a lawyer with
a client should know it. If he does not qualify on this score, he is
worse than useless in a law school no matter how glib he talks
about the law as an instrument of social control. The appreciation
of the idea is basically necessary if a university law school is to
justify its existence. A university law school cannot justify its
existence if it is little more than a trade school graduating me-
chanics, even though they be good mechanics.
To appreciate the role of law in an ordered society is to be able
to see the interrelations between law and other disciplines. We must
study and learn a good bit about the social successes and failures of
law in the past. He who knows not the past should not be permitted
to tinker with the present or the future. The man who is to do any
social engineering must understand *the kinship of law and morals.
Everybody has been jumping around for some twenty years whoop-
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ing up the idea that we must study law and economics together. We
certainly must. We have done that to some extent and the over-all
result has not told us much. There is nothing to be said against the
study of law with economics per se. There is telling criticism to be
leveled at studying law and economics with the expectation that
much will be achieved from the combination of those two disciplines
without the addition of more. Whether by conscious definition or
by accident, the kind of economics which has been mixed with the
Blackstone heritage in the law schools has been a welter of facts.
Again, certain it is that we must be strong on the facts, but the
elaborate collection of factual data simultaneously with the reading
of law does little more than fill. dull books and magazines and waste'
money. There are, of course, other things that will do the trick,
but, for the most part it is the application of history and philosophy
to the stuff of the law and to the stuff of the other social sciences,
including economics, which lights them and gives direction and
meaning to our attempts to apply controls upon society. He who
does not understand does not appreciate-and understanding means
being possessed of something more than mere technical "know
how."
6. He should have siwh a home as will permit him to teach in
it--and then do so.
So much of what has been said above is closely tied to the stub-
born and eternal verity of that old saw about Mark Hopkins and a
student at opposite ends of a log.
There was something tremendously worthwhile about reading
law in a lawyer's office, if he were the kind of man- who would talk-
to you and with you and share with you his invaluable experiences.
Of all the teachers who worked over me, three or four, and only
three or four, were great. They taught me in their homes. This is not
the sole explanation of their greatness, but they would not have been
great but for the teaching they did in their homes. I am not prepared
to state that a man cannot be a great teacher unless he does some
teaching in his home, but I very much doubt that he can. Facts,
figures and rules can be taught in the library, the classroom and the
professor's office but the only teaching that is worthy the name
needs sitting down in comfort and talking things over. You don't do
that in a library or classroom. You do not even do it in a seminar.
Most people think you do it in a professor's office, but you don't.
You do that kind of thing in a home. This business of sitting down
together in the professor's home is not a matter of "dropping in for
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tea," "open-house," and the like. It's not something that is just
"nice to do." It's basic-so basic that there is little chance of first
rate teaching on the university professional school level without the
sitting-down-chewing-it-over-in-the-home business. The implica-
tions of such a specification are manifest.
III. OVERTONES
The blueprint for a law professor outlined above prompts the
trumpeting of old familiar passages. Platitudes and commonplaces
they are. They are things that everybody knows and to which every-
body in the business pays lip service-but about which nobody really
does anything. There is much to be said for saying these things again.
Platitudes and Commonplaces are so despised not because they are
platitudes or commonplaces-but because they are most often so
disturbingly true.
Number one among the first principles which must inspire our
every act is: "Men really matter-not methods." When the law
teaching profession gathers in solemn deliberation, there is much
discussion of what the content of a course in this or that should be,
how the curriculum should be arranged, how much of a page in a
casebook should be devoted to footnotes and what is the mission of
notes (foot and otherwise), etc. etc. It's all so unimportant when
you consider that we might be talking about what is a law professor
and what should he be? Not that we never talk about law professors
-but when we do we talk about the professor as a personnel prob-
lem. That's not only useless-it's positively harmful.
I have watched a great variety of deans select a great many law
professors. It is usually done on the basis of an academic record
with little thought on the really important question: What effect is
going to be produced by the impact of this fellow upon the students?
A great many things other than academic records and an interview
are necessary to answer that question. It's not easy to find the only
kind of man who ought to be a law professor-and you just cannot
find enough of his kind unless you reward him with a salary con-
siderably more attractive than those now paid by all but three or
four of the schools. It is extremely important also that a law school
faculty be balanced on the side of the individual professors' accom-
panying disciplines. Each law professor must be something more
than just a student (or even a master) of legal rules-he must be,
in addition to being a law-man, either an economist, an historian, an
engineer, a business man or a philosopher. It is important that every
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law faculty strike a balance as to faculty members who qualify in
these accompanying disciplines-for it is these which determine a
man's approach to the law. It is important that the student be led to
the law by men of competence through each one of these approaches
and that he be led by men who will insist upon the cultural and
moral value of what is taught. During the last seventy years no
more stupid blunder has been committed than the pseudo-scientific
divorce of law from morals in law teaching. To insist upon the
separation-or even partial separation-is inane. Law is a discipline
to enable men to achieve the good. Apart from that idea teaching
law in a university loses meaning. You ought to teach law to help
men to discern what is good and what is bad.
